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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND HEALTH CARE LAW
Peter M. Mellette*
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past year, medical malpractice and health care law in
the Commonwealth have undergone significant changes. Major
case decisions and significant legislative activity, both at the state
and federal levels, have altered the playing field for many health
care providers, insurers, and consumers.
This survey article touches upon some of these important devel-
opments in medical malpractice and health care law. Over the last
year, several Supreme Court of Virginia decisions interpreted the
Medical Malpractice Act,' its application to multiple plaintiffs, and
its notice requirements. New state and federal legislation also sub-
stantially affected health care facility advertising, admissions, fire
safety requirements, and payments. Additionally, a United States
Supreme Court decision allowing a pending hospital association
suit challenging Virginia's Medicaid provider payment standards
to proceed and a Court decision on the "right to die" are among
the many precedential federal court decisions during 1990 dis-
cussed in this article.
II. STATE COURT DECISIONS AFFECTING VIRGINIA PROVIDERS
A. Medical Malpractice Decisions
1. Rules for Applying the Medical Malpractice Cap
In Bulala v. Boyd,2 the Supreme Court of Virginia answered a
series of questions raised following judgment in an eight-year-old
federal court case against a Tazewell County obstetrician. The
Fourth Circuit had asked for the court's assistance in determining
* Associate, Crews & Hancock, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1980, Dartmouth College; J.D.,
1985, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the assistance of Judith B. Henry, Esq., Steven S. Biss, Kirby H. Smith, and Sharon
A. Mounts in the preparation of this article.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
2. 239 Va. 218, 389 S.E.2d 670 (1990).
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the amount of damages to which the estate of a brain damaged
child, now deceased, and the child's parents were entitled under
state law.
The Supreme Court of Virginia decision in Bulala followed a
very active 1988-89 year in medical malpractice law, in which the
Virginia medical malpractice caps was upheld under both state4
and federal5 constitutions. While the 1988-89 decisions provided
circuit courts and federal district courts with guidance regarding
the application of the medical malpractice cap to multiple defend-
ants," the Supreme Court of Virginia decision on the certified is-
sues in Bulala addressed, for the first time, the rights of multiple
plaintiffs to collect damages for medical malpractice actions.
In Bulala, the Supreme Court of Virginia answered the following
certified questions of law:
1. Where there are two or more plaintiffs entitled to recover the
damages arising from the same act or acts of medical malpractice,
does § 8.01-581.15 [of the Code of Virginia (the "Code")] apply indi-
vidually to each plaintiff or overall to two or more such plaintiffs? If
the statute does apply to all or any combination of plaintiffs' claims,
how is it to be apportioned among them?
2. Does § 8.01-581.15 apply to damages for the infliction of emo-
tional distress arising from some act or acts of medical malpractice?
3. Does § 8.01-581.15 apply to an award of punitive damages for
an act or acts of medical malpractice?
4. Does Virginia law allow recovery for the loss of enjoyment of
life when death results from an act or acts of medical malpractice?
5. Does Virginia law allow Veronica Boyd [a brain damaged child]
to recover damages for her lost earning capacity based upon the evi-
dence presented in this case?
3. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1990) (re-
garding malpractice award limitations).
4. Etheridge v. Medical Center Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989). For a general
discussion of the Etheridge decision and the issues before the Fourth Circuit and the Su-
preme Court of Virginia in Bulala, see Stone & Hilton, Medical Malpractice: The Year in
Review: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RiCH. L. REv. 731, 744-49 (1989).
5. See Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (reversing a lower court decision that
the medical malpractice cap as applied to the case denied plaintiffs' rights to trial by jury).
6. See Etheridge, 237 Va. at 105-07, 376 S.E.2d at 534-36. In Etheridge, the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the cap on damages applied as a whole to all defendants; accordingly,
multiple judgments against defendants would be subject to a $1 million cap on all profes-
sional liability pursuant to section 8.01-581.15 of the Code.
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6. What is the effect, under §§ 8.01-21, 8.01-25, and 8.01-56 [of the
Code] of Veronica Boyd's death after verdict but before judgment in
this case? 7
In response to the first question, the supreme court decided,
based on two public policy grounds, that section 8,01-581.15 of the
Code and principles of statutory construction required the court to
limit the total damages recoverable for injury to a "patient" to the
statutory amount, regardless of the number of legal theories upon
which the plaintiffs' claims are based.8 Pursuant to the court's ra-
tionale in Bulala, the father's claim for emotional distress and the
parents' joint claim for the medical expenses of the child were
found to be wholly derivative of the child's claim and therefore
within the child's cap on damages.9 In this case, however, the court
held that the mother and child were both "patients" within the
meaning of the Medical Malpractice Act and entitled to damages
within separate statutory caps because the child was born dam-
aged, but alive, as a result of Dr. Bulala's negligence.1"
After the Supreme Court of Virginia construed who was entitled
to medical malpractice damages, the court's position on several
other certified questions became clear. The court decided that a
plaintiff seeking damages for the infliction of emotional distress
and punitive damages may do so only as a patient or through a
patient derivative claim and then only up to the statutory cap
amount.1" The court also found that Virginia law does not allow
recovery for the loss of enjoyment of life as a separately compensa-
7. Bulala, 239 Va. at 222, 389 S.E.2d at 672.
8. Id. at 228, 389 S.E.2d at 675 (noting that a different construction would defeat the
ability of the Malpractice Act to "remedy the mischief at which it is directed").
9. Id. at 228, 389 S.E.2d at 675-76.
10. Id. at 229-30, 389 S.E.2d at 676. Justices Russell and Poff disagreed with the Court's
implicit recognition that the infant injured during childbirth was both a "person" and "pa-
tient" before she was born, in light of the Court's prior rulings in Lawrence v. Craven Tire
Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969) and Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 233
(1986) (noting that an unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of wrongful death
and other personal injury statutes and common law rights). Bulala, 239 Va. at 235-36, 389
S.E.2d at 679-80. Accordingly, if the child does not live, a different result would ensue under
the majority opinion.
11. Id. at 230, 389 S.E.2d at 676; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990)
(limiting the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded to $350,000); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-38 (limiting damages in medical malpractice actions against hospitals exempt from
tort action under IRC § 501(c)(3) to $1 million or the hospital's policy limits whichever is
less).
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ble element of damages in a personal injury case. 2 Finally, the
court decided that the child was not able to recover damages for
lost earnings capacity based on the evidence presented at trial.
While a plaintiff is not absolutely precluded from recovering dam-
ages for lost future earnings by reason of infancy, the evidence
used to calculate such loss or diminution must be grounded upon
facts specific to the individual. Plaintiff's use of average statistical
assumptions was too remote and speculative to meet the court's
test.'"
2. Rulings Involving the Notice of Medical Malpractice Claim
In a series of decisions this year, the Supreme Court of Virginia
ruled that the notice of claim required by the Medical Malpractice
Act'4 is procedural in nature and does not affect a state court's
subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice claim under
certain circumstances. The court's rulings in Hudson v. Surgical
Specialists, Inc., 5 Morrison v. Bestler,'6 Cowan v. Psychiatric As-
sociates, Ltd.,' 7 and Hewitt v. Virginia Health Services Corp.8
significantly eased the timing and specificity requirements of the
notice of claim sent to a physician or other health care provider.
In Hudson, the supreme court ruled that the trial court's limita-
tion of evidence to the specific acts of negligence alleged in plain-
tiff's notice of claim was in error. The court's opinion noted that
the notice of claim
is neither a bill of particulars nor a pleading of any other kind. It is
not required to contain a summary of the plaintiff's evidence or an
exposition of the plaintiff's theories of the case. Its purpose is simply
to call the defendant's attention to the identity of the patient, the
time of the alleged malpractice, and a description of the alleged acts
of malpractice sufficient to enable the defendant to identify the case
to which plaintiff is referring."'
12. Bulala, 239 Va. at 232, 389 S.E.2d at 677 (citing McDougal v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246,
536 N.E.2d 372 (1989)).
13. Id. at 232, 389 S.E.2d at 677.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
15. 239 Va. 101, 387 S.E.2d 750 (1990).
16. 239 Va. 166, 387 S.E.2d 753 (1990).
17. 239 Va. 59, 387 S.E.2d 747 (1990).
18. 239 Va. 643, 391 S.E.2d 59 (1990).
19. Hudson, 239 Va. at 106-07, 387 S.E.2d at 753.
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Through its decision, the court thereby minimized the burden
upon a plaintiff in a medical malpractice case to perform sufficient
investigation prior to filing the notice of claim to identify with par-
ticularity the alleged acts of malpractice. As one commentator has
noted, this may allow plaintiffs to serve mere summary notices and
then change the theories or add new theories of malpractice in any
subsequent lawsuit.S0
In Morrison and Hewitt, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed the timing and service requirements of a notice of claim.
The court held in Morrison that the filing of a motion for judg-
ment immediately prior to the end of the two year statutory limi-
tations period, the subsequent filing of a notice of claim, the elec-
tion of a voluntary non-suit, and the refiling of the motion for
judgment did not prevent the plaintiff's case from going forward.21
In Hewitt, the service of a notice of claim by regular mail did not
prohibit the case from going forward.2 2
In Cowan, the plaintiff sent a notice of claim to the defendants
which met the notice requirements set forth in the Medical Mal-
practice Act. However, the notice concluded with a statement de-
nying that the Medical Malpractice Act was controlling as to the
claims alleged.23 The Supreme Court of Virginia overturned the
trial court's dismissal of the subsequent suit, filed during the 120-
day statute of limitations period following the notice of claim.
While the trial court decided that the plaintiff was estopped from
relying on the statutory tolling provisions of the Medical Malprac-
tice Act because of her disavowal of its application, the supreme
court interpreted the disavowal as an effort to preserve whatever
challenge plaintiff might have had to the constitutionality of the
Medical Malpractice Act.24
Despite the court's less restrictive interpretation of the substan-
20. Opinion, Virginia Supreme Court Limits Notice Requirements in Medical Malprac-
tice Cases, 2 (1) J. Civ. LIT. 108, 110 (1990) (noting that the court's decision may render
ineffective and unnecessary statutory provisions at § 8.01-581.2:1 of the Code, which allow a
claimant an opportunity to amend the notice to add causes of action).
21. Morrison, 239 Va. at 173, 387 S.E.2d at 758.
22. Hewitt, 239 Va. at 644-45, 391 S.E.2d at 60. The court noted that the providers' fail-
ure to object to the letter as constituting a notice of claim and to the adequacy of the notice
in the trial court prevented the providers from raising those issues on appeal. Id.
23. Cowan, 239 Va. at 61, 387 S.E.2d at 748.
24. Id. at 61-63, 387 S.E.2d at 748-49. For a discussion of the questions of constitutional-
ity of the Virginia Medical Malpractice Act, see generally Etheridge v. Medical Center
Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989) and supra notes 4 & 6 and accompanying text.
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tive filing requirements for a notice of claim, the Supreme Court of
Virginia has continued to require plaintiffs seeking damages from
alleged medical malpractice to file a notice of claim. In Gonzalez v.
Fairfax Hospital System, Inc.,2 5 the court ruled that a plaintiff al-
legedly injured while receiving treatment as a patient in a hospital
was required to file his action in accordance with the terms of the
Act, in spite of the plaintiff's claim that the tort action was based
upon a theory of "ordinary, traditional negligence."26 This decision
continued a trend of broad readings of the intended scope of the
Medical Malpractice Act for alleged torts committed by health
care providers."
3. Decisions Involving the Loss of Chance Doctrine
During 1989, a number of Virginia circuit courts ruled on the
proper application of the "loss of chance" doctrine in Virginia
medical malpractice jurisprudence. This doctrine, as applied in
other state and federal court decisions, allows a plaintiff to obtain
damages for a misdiagnosis that results in a lost opportunity to
cure and treat a particular disease or injury.28 The source of Vir-
ginia authority for the doctrine is Brown v. Koulizakis, 9 in which
the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that:
In medical malpractice cases, as in other negligence actions, the
plaintiff must establish not only that the defendant violated the ap-
plicable standard of care, and was therefore negligent, he must also
sustain the burden of showing that the negligent acts constituted a
proximate cause of the injury or death. Thus, in a death case, if a
defendant physician, by action or inaction, has destroyed any sub-
stantial possibility of the patient's survival, such conduct becomes a
25. 239 Va. 307, 389 S.E.2d 458 (1990).
26. Id. at 309, 389 S.E.2d at 459. The plaintiff's amended motion for judgment alleged
that his left toe was "traumatized and lacerated by a screw, screwlike device or other metal
object located inside" a whirlpool tub during a physical therapy session. Id. at 308, 389
S.E.2d at 458. In its ruling, the court noted that the alleged tort was "based on health care
or professional services rendered to a patient" and was rendered by "health care providers,"
thereby falling within the definitions of malpractice within the Medical Malpractice Act. Id.
at 310, 389 S.E.2d at 459-60.
27. E.g., Smith v. Teunis, 16 Va. Cir. 135 (Fairfax County 1989) (suggesting that a physi-
cian who has an extramarital affair with his patient during treatment may breach his fiduci-
ary obligation to the patient and therefore may be in violation of the Medical Malpractice
Act).
28. See, e.g., Waffen v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 799 F.2d 911 (4th Cir.
1986); Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966).
29. 229 Va. 524, 331 S.E.2d 440 (1985).
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proximate cause of the patient's death. The law does not require the
plaintiff to prove to a certainty that the patient would have lived
had he received more prompt diagnosis and treatment for the condi-
tion causing the death. 0
The language in Brown has been cited by plaintiffs as a basis for
finding that Virginia recognizes the loss of chance doctrine as a
separate cause of action.
Recent circuit court rulings in Irby v. Richmond Pediatric Asso-
ciates,31 Nolan v. Tankoos,32 and George v. Kaiser Foundation
Health3 3 have reached different conclusions from the federal
judges, rejecting the loss of chance doctrine as a separate cause of
action. As the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond reasoned in
Irby, the loss of chance doctrine does not provide a separate cause
of action. Instead, the doctrine is an evidentiary tool by which a
plaintiff can have the issue of proximate cause determined by a
jury.3 4 The court drew an analogy to res ipsa loquitur, which al-
lows the question of negligence to be determined by a jury, and it
ruled that neither theory created a separate cause of action. 5 In
Nolan, the Circuit Court of Loudoun County decided that the loss
of chance doctrine did not apply because the alleged malpractice
did not result in the death of a patient.3 8 As the Circuit Court of
Fairfax County found in George, the loss of chance doctrine re-
quired the plaintiff to show that the defendant's negligence more
probably than not caused her harm, i.e., that the defendant's ac-
tions were the substantial cause. 7
In George, the court also addressed issues of abandonment and
the length of the physician-patient relationship. As the court indi-
cated, there is an ongoing duty for the physician to continue treat-
ment as long as necessary or to make arrangements for continuing
treatment.38 However, as the Circuit Court of Rockbridge County
ruled in McDaniel v. St. Clair,39 the duty of care is continuing, but
30. Id. at 532, 331 S.E.2d at 446.
31. 16 Va. Cir. 383 (Richmond 1989).
32. 17 Va. Cir. 168 (London County 1989).
33. 15 Va. Cir. 327 (Fairfax County 1989).
34. Irby, 16 Va. Cir. at 388-89.
35. Id.
36. Nolan, 17 Va. Cir. at 170.
37. George, 15 Va. Cir. at 334.
38. Id. at 335.
39. 18 Va. Cir. 470 (Rockbridge County 1990).
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only until the statutory limitations period expires. More specifi-
cally, the court held that no claim can be brought against a physi-
cian for negligent prescribing practices when the physician had no
control over the medication refills.4"
B. Other State Court Decisions Involving Health Care Providers
1. Development Issues
Although the certificate of public need ("COPN")41 review pro-
cess was substantially deregulated by the 1989 General Assembly,42
the COPN law continues to be a source of provider litigation. In
Tidewater Psychiatric Institute, Inc. ("TPI") v. Buttery,43 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the Commissioner of
Health's decision to deny standing to a competing psychiatric hos-
pital as part of the Commissioner's decision to approve a psychiat-
ric hospital application in Virginia Beach. The court ruled that the
Commissioner's standing decision met the Virginia Real Estate
Commission v. Bias44 reasonableness standard for agency case
decisions.45
The appeals court began its review by stating that the right to
appeal an administrative case decision depends upon party status.
The court noted that TPI was not a party to the underlying case
decision on the competing hospital application. Nonetheless, the
court reasoned that TPI could claim party status to the Commis-
sioner of Health's final order denying TPI permission to intervene.
Thus, the appeals court found that TPI had a right to appeal, but
40. Id. at 476-77.
41. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.1 to .11 (Repl. Vol. 1985 and Cum. Supp. 1990).
42. Id. §§ 32.1-102.1, -102.3:1-:4 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (eliminating most health care facilities
and services from COPN review, eliminating other services effective July 1, 1991, and estab-
lishing a moratorium on new nursing home bed approvals through July 1, 1991); see gener-
ally Marshall, Health Care Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REv. 663,
698-700 (1989) (discussing the 1989 changes to these Code provisions).
43. 8 Va. App. 380, 382 S.E.2d 288, petition dismissed, No. 89-0953 (Sup. Ct. of Va. Nov.
2, 1989).
44. 226 Va. 264, 308 S.E.2d 123 (1983) (holding that an administrative agency's decision
should be reversed "only if, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable mind would
necessarily come to a different conclusion." (citing B. MEZINEs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 51.01
(1981))). See also Johnston-Willis Ltd. v. Kenley, 6 Va. App. 231, 369 S.E.2d 1 (1988) (ap-
plying Bias standard to a COPN case decision).
45. TPI, 8 Va. App. at 386, 382 S.E.2d at 291-92. See VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4 (Repl. Vol.
1989)(definition of a "case decision"). See also Kenley v. Newport News Gen. and Non-
Sectarian Hosp. Assn., 227 Va. 39, 314 S.E.2d 52 (1984)(discussing the requirements of a
case decision in COPN law context).
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only the issue of TPI's standing, not the underlying COPN
decision.4"
In its review of another COPN case decision, the Circuit Court
of Arlington County affirmed the Commissioner's decision that, in
spite of deregulation, operating room tables in ambulatory surgery
centers and, by implication, in hospitals, are still subject to COPN
review. 47 In reaching its decision, the circuit court adopted the
Commissioner's earlier finding that an additional operating room is
the functional equivalent of an increase in the total number of
"beds" in an ambulatory surgery center, and that the COPN issued
to Fairfax Surgical Center "was, and is, a document of continuing
force which must be reviewed when modifications are sought" to a
licensed facility. 48
The Commissioner's underlying decision was reached prior to
the COPN deregulation. Accordingly, treatment of an ambulatory
surgery table or inpatient operating room table as analogous to an
inpatient bed and therefore subject to review may carry less force
today than when the Health Commissioner decided the case on
April 26, 1988. While ambulatory surgery centers remain subject to
COPN review, as of July 1, 1991 hospital beds and ambulatory sur-
gery center operating rooms will no longer be subject to COPN re-
view at all.
2. Medical Staff Issues
During the last year, at least one Virginia court has refused to
interfere in a private hospital's medical staff appointment deci-
sions, following the lead of the Supreme Court of Virginia's 1988
46. TPI, 8 Va. App. at 386, 382 S.E.2d at 291-92. In practice, this type of standing al-
lowed TPI to argue the merits of the case as part of its grounds for claiming standing. Id.
47. Fairfax Surgical Center, Inc. v. State Health Commissioner, No. 17076 (Arlington
County Cir. Ct. 1989), appeal filed, No. 0388-90-4 (Mar. 12, 1990).
48. Id. The court's decision apparently relied upon a prior unpublished circuit court rul-
ing in St. Mary's Hosp. of Norton v. Baliles, which determined that a COPN exists beyond
the initial licensure of the COPN approved project and thereby prohibits further modifica-
tions to that project outside of the COPN review process. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-102.3, -
102.10, -125, -126 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1990) (relationship of COPN and licensure
laws).
49. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3:3. But see SEC'Y OF HEALTH & HUMAN RESOURCES,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE VIRGINIA MEDICAL CARE FACILITIES CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC
NEED PROGRAM 4-13 (Aug. 22, 1990) (finding full COPN deregulation of hospital, and ambu-
latory surgery centers premature and proposing elimination of COPN sunset and reregula-
tion of certain services).
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decision in Medical Center Hospitals v. Terzis.50 In the Circuit
Court of the City of Norfolk case of Amarasinge v. Sentara Hospi-
tals,51 the court found that Dr. Amarasinge's failure to note his
loss of privileges at another hospital in his Sentara reapplication
for privileges fell within one of the statutory grounds for denial of
staff privileges at the hospital.2 In its ruling, the Norfolk circuit
court specifically found that the hospitals' corporate and medical
staff bylaws did not constitute a contract between Dr. Amarasinge
and Sentara Hospitals. 3
III. 1990 GENERAL ASSEMBLY LEGISLATION
A. Psychiatric Treatment Legislation
1. Changes in Treatment Practices
The 1990 General Assembly enacted significant legislation affect-
ing psychiatric treatment practices and procedures and referral re-
lationships between hospitals and physicians in general. The 1990
legislation followed the recommendations of two study committees
established by a resolution during the 1988 and 1989 General As-
sembly sessions.54 The flurry of psychiatric treatment practice leg-
50. 235 Va. 443, 367 S.E.2d 728 (1988) (interpreting VA. CODE ANn. § 32.1-134.1 (Repl.
Vol. 1985)). In Terzis, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that Virginia courts are without
jurisdiction to prevent a private hospital from excluding a physician from its medical staff
in the absence of a contract between the hospital and the physician and as long as the
hospital complies with § 32.1-1341.1 of the Code, which provides that the hospital give the
physician a written statement of reasons that fall within the statutory criteria. For a discus-
sion of the Terzis decision, see Gravely, Health Care Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law,
22 U. RICH. L. REv. 667, 679-81 (1988).
51. No. C89-1758 (City of Norfolk Cir. Ct. May 3, 1990), reprinted in 6(2) HEALTH L.
NEWS 22 (Va. St. B. June 1990).
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also Medical Center Hosps., 235 Va. at 445, 367 S.E.2d at 729 (the Supreme
Court of Virginia assumed without deciding that the bylaws of a private hospital constitute
a contract between the hospital and a physician on the hospital medical staff). For further
discussion of state and federal court cases addressing this issue see Marshall, supra note 42,
at 683-87.
In a new twist to litigation filed following termination of medical staff privileges, a group
of Virginia radiologists, whose non-exclusive hospital contract and related hospital privileges
were terminated, have alleged in a breach of contract/state antitrust suit that the hospital
required the radiology group to buy services at higher than market rates from a hospital
affiliate as a condition to obtaining an exclusive contract. This allegation has led to a Medi-
care fraud and abuse investigation of the hospital and could lead to administrative sanc-
tions. See Larkin, Suit Alleges Hospital Sought "Kickback" for Exclusive Contract, Am.
Med. News, May 11, 1990 at 13, 14.
54. See REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDYING CERTAIN PRACTICES AMONG PSY-
CHIATRIC PROFESSIONALS, (S. Doc. No. 41 (1990)); REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUD-
664
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islation during the 1990 General Assembly session was prompted
in part by legislative concerns that psychiatric professionals, psy-
chiatric facilities, and private review agents have been responding
to incentives that increase the cost of patient care and which may
affect the quality of such care.5
The treatment practice legislation includes prohibitions on pay-
ments for referrals of all patients, based on existing authority in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs e.5  The new law delegates to
the Board of Health, the Board of Mental Health, Mental Retarda-
tion, and Substance Abuse Services, and the Board of Medicine
the responsibility of adopting regulations consistent with the anti-
referral legislation.5 7 Although the legislation does not include spe-
cific penalties for violations, penalties already exist in other sec-
tions of the Health Code5 and the Professions Code 59 as incentive
to providers and practitioners to comply with the anti-referral leg-
islation in cases involving patients who are not eligible for Medi-
care or Medicaid. 0 The Joint Subcommittee recommended anti-
YING ADMISSION OF MINORS TO PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES, (H. Doc. No. 71 (1989)).
55. See STAFF OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITrEE STUDYING CERTAIN PRACTICES AMONG PSYCHI-
ATRIC PROFESSIONALS, SJR 191 INITIAL STAFF BRIEFING PAPER, at 1-2 (June 1989); S.J. Res.
22 Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990) (expressing the General Assembly's support of the
development of alternative levels of care for psychiatric and substance abuse treatment and
insurance coverage that will reimburse for such care); S.J. Res. 23, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990
Sess. (1990) (continuing the Joint Subcommittee Studying Mandated Substance Abuse
Treatment and Prevention Programs).
The accelerating demand and costs of health care services, especially for psychiatric and
substance abuse services, and the large number of persons without any form of health insur-
ance prompted the General Assembly to pass a limited mandated benefit accident and sick-
ness insurance policy statute, which appears to allow health care insurers to offer insurance
policies that no longer contain psychiatric and substance abuse coverage. See VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 38.2-3425 to -3430 (Int. Supp. 1990). The 1990 General Assembly passed several laws
designed to regulate and study the cost and utilization of mandated benefits. See id. §§
38.2-3419.1, -3608, -4214, -4319 (Int. Supp. 1990). The General Assembly also continued the
legislative study committee on mandated benefits, see S.J. Res. 23, and established a perma-
nent special advisory commission to the Governor and the General Assembly on the social
and financial impact of current and proposed mandated benefits and providers. See VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 9-297 to -300 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
56. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-135.2, 37.1-186.1, 54.1-2962.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (all referring
to federal prohibitions on patient referrals for renumeration at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b(b)(1988)).
57. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-135.2, 37.1-186.1, 54.1-2962.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
58. See id. § 32.1-27.1 (granting the Board of Health and the Commissioner the authority
to issue civil monetary penalties).
59. See id. § 54.1-2914 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1990) (defining such practices as
unprofessional and thereby giving the Board authority to take adverse licensure action
against physicians violating the anti-referral statute).
60. Arguably, federal law now provides sufficient incentive to prohibit abusive practices in
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referral legislation as a result of isolated reports that psychiatric
facilities paid employees of psychiatric hotline services commis-
sions for referrals of patients to psychiatric facilities."'
Another bill aimed at psychiatric hospital providers in particular
will regulate psychiatric facility advertising for the first time. 2 The
new law authorizes the Board of Mental Health, Mental Retarda-
tion and Substance Abuse Services to establish regulations
designed to prohibit advertisements from containing false and mis-
leading information or false and misleading representations as to
the fees charged for services.6" Such legislation resulted from com-
plaints by legislators and those testifying before the committee
that existing psychiatric provider advertisements were somehow
lacking in taste and veracity, and that consumers were unsure of
where to go to resolve their complaints.6 4
Additional legislation endorsed by the Joint Subcommittee and
approved by the General Assembly should benefit providers who
are dealing with a utilization review process that has grown more
complex and costly. The new legislation requires companies per-
forming utilization review to register with and obtain certification
from the State Corporation Commission if they intend to do busi-
ness in Virginia. 5 The Virginia statute, based upon an existing
Maryland statute regulating private review agents, 6 establishes a
the case of Medicare and Medicaid patients. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (providing for civil
monetary penalties and exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid for abusive practices); see
also infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
61. S. Doc. No. 41, supra note 54, at 7; see also Cornish, The New Psychiatry of Care,
Daily Press/The Times-Herald, October 30, 1989, at Supp. 13, 22 (describing allegations
raised before the Joint Subcommittee by a former Tidewater Psychiatric Institute employee
concerning benefits given hotline workers and medical staff members for patient referrals
and bonuses for increasing the patient census given to other employees).
62. See VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-188.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
63. Id.
64. Sen. Doc. No. 41, supra note 54, at 5; see also Cornish, supra note 61, at Supp. 13, 22
(discussing reaction to "scare tactics" employed in some psychiatric facility advertising).
65. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-4214, 38.2-4319, 38.2-5300 to -5303 (Int. Supp. 1990).
66. See MD. HEALTH GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1301 to -1303 (1990). The Maryland statute
applies to review by non-hospital affiliated entities and requires disclosure of standards used
by private review agents in evaluating hospital care. The Act also provides for penalties and
for judicial review to persons aggrieved by private review agent decisions. Id. §§ 19-1312 to -
1313. The Joint Subcommittee of the Virginia General Assembly that studied psychiatric
treatment practices recommended a statute with provisions similar to the Maryland statute.
See S. Doc. No. 41, supra note 54, at 6, Attachment H.
The statute adopted by the General Assembly does not provide for judicial review explic-
itly; instead, it states that a private right of action will not accrue to persons affected by the
statute as a result of the statute's enactment. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5308 (Int. Supp.
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series of requirements as prerequisites to certification of private
review agents which are not health maintenance organizations," or
health insurers, hospital service corporations, or preferred provider
organizations that perform reviews on their own subscribers or pa-
tients. 8 In addition, the statute excludes from registration require-
ments all private review agents contracting with the Medicare pro-
gram69 and private review agents engaged by pension plans
otherwise exempt from regulation under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act7 0 through a State Corporation Commission
waiver.71 The private review agent legislation establishes other re-
quirements for the State Corporation Commission approval of pri-
vate review agent certification 2 and includes a provision assuring
1990). Additionally, the Virginia law, unlike the Maryland law, does not require the disclo-
sure of review standards used by private review agents, only the procedures followed in
applying the review standards. See id. § 38.2-5302.1. While many providers would like to
know the review standards applied by private review agents in order to avoid possible con-
flicts, utilization review agents have fought disclosure of review criteria out of fears that
provider would use the information to "game" the review process and thereby avoid any
cost savings that might result from utilization review. For a general discussion of the pur-
pose of utilization review and the trade-offs between improvements in the quality of care
and cost savings in the peer review process, see Mellette, The Changing Focus of Peer Re-
view Under Medicare, 20 U. RiCH. L. REv. 315 (1986).
67. For a definition of a health maintenance organization, see VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4300
(Int Supp. 1990).
68. Id. § 38.2-5300 (defining "private review agent").
69. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-1 to c-ll (1988) (authorizing the Department of Health and
Human Services to contract with regional peer review organizations to review the quality
and cost of care rendered to Medicare patients). For a general discussion of the Medicare
peer review program, see Mellette, supra note 66; Gosfield, PROs: A Case Study in Utiliza-
tion Management and Quality Control, 1989 HEALTH LAw HANDBOOK (1989).
70. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1416 (1988).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5306 (Int. Supp. 1990).
72. See id. § 38.2-5302. The certification statute requires that private review agents pay a
filing fee, and include in an application the following minimum standards and any addi-
tional standards established by regulation:
1. A description of the procedures to be used in evaluating proposed or delivered
hospital, medical or other health care services;
2. The procedures by which patients or providers may seek reconsideration determi-
nations by private review agents;
3. The type and qualifications of the personnel either employed or under contract to
perform the utilization review;
4. Procedures and policies which ensure that patient-specific medical records and in-
formation shall be kept strictly confidential except as authorized by the patient or by
regulations adopted pursuant to [the private review agent] chapter; and
5. Assurances that reviewers be readily accessible by telephone to patients and prov-
iders at least 40 hours per week during normal business hours.
Id. The State Corporation Commission must promulgate regulations which include the fol-
lowing requirements:
1. Minimum qualifications to perform review;
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private review agent access to and confidentiality of patient-spe-
cific medical records and information. 3
2. Admission of Minors Legislation
The Virginia General Assembly also enacted sweeping legislation
modifying the psychiatric admissions process for minors. 4 The
General Assembly passed the admissions practice legislation in ap-
parent response to concerns that prior Virginia law governing ad-
mission of minors to psychiatric facilities75 was not being uni-
formly applied in the state owned and private psychiatric
facilities.76 Proponents of the legislation also argued that minors
differ in their capacity to consent to voluntary psychiatric treat-
ment and that the interest of parents in seeking psychiatric treat-
ment for their minor children may not always be coincidental with
the best interests of the children.7
The psychiatric admission of minors legislation codified a
slightly modified version of pre-existing non-judicial and judicial
processes for the admission of minors to psychiatric facilities. The
non-judicial process applies to any minor under fourteen years of
age, whether he objects to the admission or not, and to any minor
over fourteen years of age who consents jointly with his parents or
who is incapable of consenting but does not object.7 s8 The primary
difference between prior voluntary admission practices and the
non-judicial process mandated by the 1990 statute is that a volun-
tary admission now requires an independent clinical evaluation of
the minor which supports the parents' and admitting practitioner's
2. Procedures which require the private review agent to provide the attending physi-
cian an opportunity to consult with a physician advisor prior to issuance of a final
denial in any case in which there is an initial recommendation to deny coverage;
3. Guidelines regarding access to and confidentiality of patient-specific medical
records and information; and
4. Setting the amount of application fees required by this chapter, which shall be
sufficient to pay for the administrative costs of regulation ...
Id. § 38.2-5309. The legislation also includes an administrative appeal process for private
review agents denied a registration certificate. Id. § 38.2-5305.
73. Id. § 38.2-5307.
74. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-335 to -348 (Cum. Supp. 1990). The legislation was the result
of a study committee which incorporated provisions from failed legislative efforts in prior
General Assembly sessions. See generally H. Doc. No. 71, supra note 54.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-275 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
76. See H. Doc. No. 71, supra note 54, at 3-4, 9-10.
77. Id.
78. VA. CODE. ANN. § 16.1-338 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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decision to admit.79 The minor who voluntarily agrees to treatment
but later objects must be discharged within forty-eight hours un-
less a parent or other person petitions the local juvenile and do-
mestic relations court for involuntary admission.80 The new volun-
tary admission law also sets a statutory timeframe for the
initiation of a treatment plan for the minor"' and requires re-eval-
uation of the minor after ninety days of inpatient treatment.8 2
The judicial process authorized by the new statute depends on
whether the minor or his parents object to inpatient psychiatric
treatment. The law establishes specific procedures for parental ad-
mission of objecting minors fourteen years of age or older8" and for
other involuntary admissions where a parent of an objecting minor
also objects or is unavailable. s4 In authorizing either type of admis-
sion, the juvenile and domestic relations judge or a special justice
must find, based upon the report of a qualified evaluator or the
community services board,8 5 (1) that there is no less restrictive al-
79. See id. (use of qualified evaluator in voluntary admissions). The qualified evaluator
must be a psychiatrist or psychologist skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of mental ill-
ness in minors. If such psychiatrist or psychologist is unavailable or, in the case of involun-
tary admissions, has a financial interest in the minor's hospitalization, then any mental
health professional licensed by the Virginia Department of Health Professions or employed
by a community services board may serve as the qualified evaluator. See id. § 16.1-336 (de-
fining qualified evaluator); id. § 16.1-339 (use of qualified evaluator report in judicial pro-
ceedings with objecting minor 14 years of age or older); id. § 16.1-342 (use of qualified evalu-
ator in involuntary commitment proceedings). As part of his evaluation and substantiation
of the admission after the fact, the qualified evaluator must make the following written
findings in support of continued voluntary admission:
1. The minor appears to have a mental illness serious enough to warrant inpatient
treatment and is reasonably likely to benefit from the treatment;
2. The minor has been provided with a clinically appropriate explanation of the na-
ture and purpose of the treatment;
3. If the minor is 14 years of age or older, that he has been provided with an explana-
tion of his rights as they would apply if he were to object to admission, and that he
has consented to admission; and
4. All available modalities of treatment less restrictive than inpatient treatment have
been considered and no less restrictive alternative is available that would offer com-
parable benefits to the minor.
Id. § 16.1-338(B).
80. Id. § 16.1-338(D).
81. Id. § 16.1-338(C) (requiring a treatment plan to be developed within ten days of ad-
mission and that the minor be discharged as soon as he fails to meet the criteria for
admission).
82. Id. § 16.1-338(E).
83. Id. § 16.1-339.
84. Id. §§ 16.1-341 to -346.
85. A "community services board" remains undefined in the minor psychiatric treatment
legislation. However, Chapter 10 of the Mental Health Code defines and identifies the pow-
ers of "community services boards" to include operation of community mental health pro-
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ternative available, (2) that the minor presents a danger to himself
or others to the extent that severe injury is likely to result as evi-
denced by recent threats or conduct, (3) that the minor is exper-
iencing a serious deterioration of his ability to care for himself in a
developmentally age-appropriate manner, as evidenced by delusio-
nary thinking or by significant impairment of functioning in hydra-
tion, nutrition, self-protection, or self-control, and (4) that the mi-
nor is in need of inpatient treatment and is likely to benefit from
such treatment."s An initial hearing to consider the minor's uncon-
senting or involuntary admission must take place within twenty-
four hours unless a legal representative of the minor requests an
extension of up to seventy-two hours.87 The statute also provides
for emergency treatment of minors through the use of a temporary
detaining order prior to an involuntary commitment hearing."8
B. Provider Licensure Legislation
One of the most celebrated pieces of legislation during the 1990
General Assembly session was the new requirement for sprinklers
in nursing home buildings 9 and smoke detectors in home-for-adult
buildings.90 Additional legislation affecting nursing homes and
home-for-adult facilities include changes in the COPN law which
extend the moratorium on approval of additional nursing home
grams and evaluation of clients. See id. §§ 37.1-194 to -198 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Cum. Supp.
1990).
Pursuant to separate legislation passed by the 1990 General Assembly, the community
services boards are required to assist in the evaluation of persons taken into temporary
judicial or police custody for emergency evaluation of the need for inpatient psychiatric
hospitalization. See id. § 37.1-67.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990); see sources cited infra note 88.
86. Id. §§ 16.1-339(B), -345.
87. Id. § 16.1-339.
88. Id. § 16.1-340 (referring to § 37.1-67.1). The 1990 General Assembly adopted several
changes to the involuntary commitment statutes, including a procedure for temporary cus-
tody for evaluation of the need for inpatient hospitalization pending judicial and clinical
review of the need for a temporary detention order. Id. § 37.1-67.1. The General Assembly
also enacted revisions to the detention order timing requirements and the hearing require-
ments for subsequent commitment orders. Id. §§ 37.1-67.1, - 67.3.
89. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-126.2 (Cum. Supp. 1990)(requiring sprinklers or other fire
suppression systems in all nursing home buildings by January 1, 1993 as a condition of
licensure). Nursing homes are defined and licensed as health care facilities under the Health
Code. See id. §§ 32.1-123, -125 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
90. See id. § 36-99.5:1 (Cum. Supp. 1990). Home-for-adult facilities are defined by law
and licensed by the Department of Social Services to provide for maintenance or care of
aged, infirm or disabled adults who are generally ambulatory upon initial residence at the
facility. See id. §§ 63.1-172, -174.1, -175 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
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beds through June 30, 1991,91 allow exceptions to the moratorium
on nursing home bed approvals for home-for-adult facilities,92 and
allow replacement of existing nursing home facilities to be con-
structed at offsite locations under certain circumstances.9 3 These
changes in the Commissioner of Health's COPN authority are in-
terim in nature. The Commission on Health Care for All Virginians
is currently examining issues related to the COPN program, in-
cluding its continued future.9 4 Other legislative resolutions provide
the Commission with a list of additional issues to study.9
C. AIDS Legislation
The flurry of recent legislation concerning the human immu-
nodeficiency virus ("HIV") continued in the 1990 General Assem-
bly. The General Assembly passed three laws affecting the HIV in-
fected population including a law which permits testing of
convicted prostitutes for HIV infection with or without consent 96
and a series of amendments to the 1989 HIV test confidentiality
statute. 7 A third statute establishes a new procedure for isolation
91. Id. § 32.1-102.3:2 (Cum. Supp. 1990). For a discussion of the reasons behind the cur-
rent moratorium on approval of additional nursing home beds, see Marshall, supra note 42,
at 697-700; Gravely, supra note 50, at 668-70.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.3:2. These exceptions would be granted to facilities which
accept specialty, heavy-care patients, such as AIDS, ventilator-dependent and head/spinal
cord injury patients, and which convert no more than thirty beds to serve these patients. Id.
For information on the licensure requirements of nursing home facilities, see id. §§ 32.1-125
to -137 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1990).
93. See id. § 32.1-102.3:2 (allowing offsite replacement of existing facilities at locations
within the same city or county and within reasonable proximity to the current site when
replacement on the current site is proven infeasible).
94. See COMMISSION ON HEALTH CARE FOR ALL VIRGINIANS, S.J. Res. 118, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly, 1990 Sess. (1990). The Commission also has the mandate to study ways to minimize the
number of uninsured Virginians, to preserve access to acute care services in isolated areas of
the Commonwealth, to provide for equitable allocation of state funds for health care, and to
expand the availability of various types and levels of services to elderly Virginians for long
term care. The Commission also has the authority to investigate a number of health insur-
ance and Medicaid issues, including eligibility for insurance and Medicaid payments and
reimbursement for various provider services. For discussion of a recent United States Su-
preme Court case addressing state requirements for Medicaid payments to hospitals and
nursing homes, see infra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., H.J. Res. 213, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sass. (1990) (requesting the Commis-
sion to study objective means of determining whether new medical technologies and proce-
dures are "experimental" or "investigative"); S.J. Res. Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990)
(requesting that the Commission study managed medical care for Virginia Medicaid recipi-
ents); S.J. Res. 60, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess. (1990) (requesting that the Commission
examine hospital duplicative billing practices).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-346.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
97. See id. §§ 32.1-36.1, 32.1-88 (limiting any duty of disclosure).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of persons with communicable diseases.98
The isolation statute allows the Commissioner of Health to peti-
tion a general district court in the county or city in which a person
with a communicable disease resides for an isolation order.9  Such
orders are appropriate where persons with communicable diseases
are engaging in "at-risk behavior," defined by statute as "engaging
in acts which a person, who has been informed that he is infected
with a communicable disease, knows may infect other persons
without taking appropriate precautions to protect the health of the
other persons.0' °
If a court finds that isolation of a person with a communicable
disease is necessary to protect the public health, 10' the court may
order isolation of the person in the person's home, another's resi-
dence, or an institution. 0 2 The general district court's isolation or-
der is valid for no more than 120 days and may be enforced
through the use of electronic monitoring devices.03 The order may
also require the person with the communicable disease to partici-
pate in counseling and education programs. 104
Prior to the issuance of an isolation order by a general district
court, the Commissioner may seek a temporary detaining order for
up to forty-eight hours. 10 5 Isolation orders are subject to review de
novo by a circuit court and must be heard on a priority basis. 1'
D. Medical Records and Reports
Actions by the 1990 General Assembly assisted patients in their
efforts to obtain medical records from health care providers other
98. See id. §§ 32.1-48.01 to -.04.
99. Id. § 32.1-48.03.
100. Id. § 32.1-48.01.
101. This requires the court to find that the following conditions are met:
1. The person is infected with a communicable disease.
2. The person is engaging in at-risk behavior.
3. The person has demonstrated an intentional disregard for the health of the public
by engaging in behavior which has placed others at risk for infection.
4. There is no other reasonable alternative means of reducing the risk to public
health.
Id. § 32.1-48.04(B).
102. Id. § 32.1-48.04(C).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 32.1-48.03(B). The 48 hour detention order may be extended to up to 96 hours
if the specified detention period terminates on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Id.
106. Id. § 32.1-48.04(D).
.[Vol. 24:655
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
than hospitals and physicians. One law established the rights of
patients to subpoena copies of medical records from all health care
providers, as that term is defined in the Medical Malpractice
Act.107 Companion legislation also set a reasonable charge limit for
photocopies of subpoenaed health care provider records at fifty
cents per page and established a search fee not to exceed fifteen
dollars for hospitals. 0
Another 1990 General Assembly law stipulates that any request-
ing patient must be given an itemized statement of the charges for
services rendered by a health care provider, regardless of whether a
bill for services has been or will be submitted to any third party
payor.10e Additional changes also allow parties in disputes with in-
surance companies access to medical reports or records by
statute." 0
E. Medical Treatment Directives
The 1990 General Assembly made minor revisions to the durable
power of attorney for health care decisions statute adopted by the
1989 General Assembly."" The 1990 revision eliminated the bur-
den placed upon physicians by the 1989 legislation to inquire into
the validity of the durable power of attorney."2 The 1990 General
Assembly carried over legislation that would have eliminated the
remaining burden upon physicians, i.e., that a physician obtain a
written certification by another licensed physician or clinical psy-
chologist, not otherwise involved in the treatment of the person
assessed, prior to relying upon the durable power of attorney for
health care decisions for the initiation or cessation of treatment.'
F. Medicaid and Charity Care Program Changes
The 1990 changes to the Department of Medical Assistance Ser-
vices' ("DMAS") statutory authority included clarifications to the
provider overpayment recovery statute. The 1990 amendment will
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-413 (Cur. Supp. 1990) (citing the definition of health care
provider at id. § 8.01-581.1).
108. Id.
109. Id. § 54.1-2404 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
110. Id. § 16.1-88.2 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
111. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4 (Cur. Supp. 1990). For a discussion of the applicability
and scope of this statute, see generally Marshall, supra note 42, at 663-68.
112. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-134.4(B).
113. See S.B. 255, Va. Gen. Assembly, 1990 Sess., (offered January 23, 1990).
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facilitate efforts by DMAS to recover Medicaid overpayments to
providers from successors in interest of a provider" 4 by giving
DMAS the authority to obtain payment recoveries from providers
who terminate operations, sell health care facilities, or reorganize
those facilities. 115 The statute expanded the existing authority of
DMAS to obtain repayment of reimbursable depreciation to nurs-
ing home providers 16 and to recover overpayments from providers
who do not terminate their provider agreement with DMAS.1" It
also provides DMAS with a remedy against providers who go bank-
rupt and whose owners offer services to Medicaid patients through
ownership of other existing or newly formed provider entities.
Other changes to the Medicaid program include the establish-
ment of a new drug review committee" s and statutes establishing a
Medicaid drug formulary which will allow DMAS to limit drugs
eligible for payment by the Medicaid program to those drugs in
the Virginia Medicaid drug formulary." l9 The DMAS Director will
have the authority to negotiate and enter into agreements with
drug manufacturers on payment discounts for the use of a manu-
facturer's prescription drugs by Virginia Medicaid program benefi-
ciaries. 12 The Director will also have the authority to negotiate
with health care providers to provide services to Medicaid recipi-
ents needing special assistance.' 2' Providers rendering services to
special needs patients such as persons with AIDS or those on ven-
tilators may receive special contract rates from DMAS as a result
of the statutory amendment.122 The 1990 General Assembly also
enacted other technical changes in the Medicaid eligibility statutes
to comply with federal law requirements governing Medicaid pa-
tient eligibility. 123
Finally, there were further changes to the Virginia Indigent
Health Care Trust Fund statutes enacted by the 1989 General As-
sembly. These amendments included minor revisions to the dead-
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-325.1:1 (Cum. Supp. 1990) (defining successors in interest to
include any person having stockholders, directors, officers, or partners in common with a
health care provider for which an agreement has been terminated).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 32.1-329 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
117. Id. § 32.1-325.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
118. See id. §§ 32.1-331.1 to .5.
119. Id. §§ 32.1-331.6 to .11.
120. Id. § 32.1-331.11.
121. Id § 32.1-325.1(E).
122. Id.
123. See id. §§ 32.1-324.1(B), -325(A).
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lines for hospitals to file charity care data,124 the method of calcu-
lating each hospital's cost of charity care, the annual contribution
rate,125 and the method of calculating the annual distributions to
hospitals for charity care provided in excess of the charity care
standard.126
IV. FEDERAL LAW ISSUES AFFECTING VIRGINIA PROVIDERS
A. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989
1. Proscriptions on Patient Referrals
After much fanfare and debate, the United States Congress de-
cided to proscribe physician referrals of Medicare patients to inde-
pendent clinical laboratories owned in whole or in part by the re-
ferring physician.127 The anti-referral legislation was originally
intended to address all physician referral relationships that could
have an impact on the volume and cost of services provided to
Medicare patients.128 The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989,
along with its 1988 predecessor bill, 29 would have barred virtually
all referrals by physicians to entities, including hospitals and nurs-
ing homes in which the physician held a financial interest.1 30 The
legislation would have also prohibited any entity, within the con-
trol of a physician or in which the physician held a financial inter-
est, from billing any individual, third-party payor, or other entities
for items or services 3' provided by the entity pursuant to a patient
referral by the physician.132
The penalties for physicians and clinical laboratory providers
who fail to abide by the requirements of the anti-referral statute
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-336 (Cure. Supp. 1990). For a discussion of the purpose of the
Virginia Indigent Health Care Trust Fund and its operation, see Marshall, supra note 42, at
701-02.
125. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-337(C), (E), (F).
126. Id. § 32.1-338.
127. See Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2236 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn
(West Supp. 1990)).
128. H.R. 939, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989). A recent report from the Health Care Financ-
ing Administration indicates that health care spending grew by over 10% in 1988. See
Health Spending Spurted 10.4% in '88 After Downturn-HCFA, Am. Med. News, May 10,
1990, at 10.
129. H.R. 5198, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).
130. Id. § 2(a).
131. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v) (1982 and West Supp. 1990) (definition of "items and
services").
132. See H.R., 939 § 2(a).
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are significant. The clinical laboratory provider may not receive
any payment for services provided and must refund any amounts
that were billed in violation of the Act. 133 The clinical laboratory
provider is subject to a civil penalty of $15,000 for each service
provided contrary to the statute or for which the provider has
failed to refund any billings received. 3 4 Other penalties for circum-
vention schemes include exclusion from the Medicare program and
a civil penalty of up to $100,000."'1
There are two separate reporting requirements under the stat-
ute. First, clinical laboratory providers must advise the Secretary
of Health and Human Services of the name and provider number
for referring physicians regardless of whether an exception applies
to the current referral proscription.13 6 Additionally, a clinical labo-
ratory provider must indicate whether or not the referring physi-
cian is "an interested investor," i.e., a physician in a position to
make or to influence referrals or business to the clinical laboratory
provider or the referrals or business of an immediate family mem-
ber.13 7 The failure to report such information can result in exclu-
sion from the Medicare program or assessment of a civil penalty in
an amount not to exceed $2,000.18 In addition, all Medicare prov-
iders of covered items or services must provide the Secretary of
Health and Human Services with information concerning the en-
tity's ownership arrangements, including the covered items and
services provided by the entity and the names and Medicare pro-
vider numbers of the physicians who are interested investors, or
who are immediate relatives of interested investors. 39 This report-
ing requirement must be met in accordance with instructions from
the Secretary by no later than December 19, 1990. Civil penalties
of $10,000 apply to persons who do not comply with the reporting
requirement. 140
133. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395nn(g) (West Supp. 1990).
134. Id. § 1395nn(g)(3).
135. Id. § 1395nn(g)(4).
136. Id. § 1395nn(f).
137. Id.
138. Id. § 1395nn(g)(3).
139. Id. § 1395nn(f).
140. Id. § 1395nn(g)(5). The patient referral legislation also includes several study provi-
sions which request the General Accounting Office to study the impact of physician owner-
ship of health care facilities and entities on the utilization of Medicare covered items and
services by Medicare beneficiaries, their Medicare expenditures, and service provider com-
petition. See 103 Stat. at 2241. The Secretary is also required to report on the utilization of
Medicare covered items and services by Medicare beneficiaries served by entities in which
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2. Amendment to the Patient Dumping Legislation
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1989 in-
cluded significant changes to a five-year-old statutory requirement
which obligates hospitals and physicians to screen patients
presenting themselves at hospital emergency rooms across the
country. 4  The OBRA 1989 amendments to the Consolidated Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 provisions became effec-
tive July 1, 1990.142
In the original patient dumping law, Congress required that all
Medicare participating hospitals screen patients presenting them-
selves for treatment to determine if an emergency condition was
present or if patients were in active labor. If a prescreening test
revealed either condition, both the hospital and the emergency de-
partment physician had a statutory duty to stabilize the patient
before discharge, unless the patient had requested a transfer or the
responsible physician attested in writing that the benefits of pa-
tient transfer outweighed the risks and received permission from
the receiving hospital prior to the transfer. 4  Additionally, the
transferring hospital had the obligation to transfer medical records
and to assure that patient transfer was appropriate by sending
qualified personnel with the transferred patient. 4 4 Inappropriate
prescreening examinations or inappropriate transfers in violation
of the patient dumping law could result in the termination of the
provider agreement, civil monetary penalties, and state law per-
sonal liability suits. 4 5
the referring physician has a direct or indirect financial interest and by Medicare benefi-
ciaries served by other entities. Id. The latter provision suggests that proscriptions for phy-
sician referrals to other physician controlled providers of Medicare covered items and ser-
vices beyond clinical laboratories could take place in the near future.
141. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1990).
142. See Pinkney, Stricter Patient Transfer Rules Effective July 1, Am. Med. News,
June 29, 1990, at 1.
143. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd(c)(2).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 1395dd(d). Notably, the duty to evaluate and treat patients at common law did
not exist. It is only with the gradual changes in case law over time that hospitals have been
required to treat patients who have entered the emergency room of a hospital in reliance on
the custom that care is rendered in an emergency in the emergency room. This duty to treat
has been expanded over time through other federal statutes. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1988)
(the Hill-Burton Act) (providing funds for construction and modernization of health care
facilities in consideration for facilities agreeing to meet specific uncompensated care obliga-
tions over a 20 year period and to care for Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries for the life
of the facility). The patient dumping law goes beyond both prior case law and the Hill-
Burton Act obligations to require that hospitals care for any patient who comes into the
1990]
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Since the enactment of the patient dumping law, reports of pa-
tient dumping activities have continued to make headlines. 46
Questions regarding the implementation of the patient dumping
law had been raised before legislative committees 147 and by a divi-
sion of the agency responsible for investigating patient dumping
complaints. 148 Although a number of complaints had been investi-
gated and penalties issued, 149 Congress apparently enacted the
statutory amendments to respond to external and internal criti-
cisms of patient dumping law enforcement.
The OBRA 1989 amendments eliminate the definition of "re-
sponsible physician" originally in the statute. The amendments
specify that any physician who is responsible for examination,
treatment or transfer of a patient in a participating hospital and
who knowingly violates the appropriate transfer provisions is sub-
ject to a civil monetary penalty and/or exclusion from the Medi-
care program.150 The 1989 OBRA amendments also substitute the
emergency room in an emergency condition or in labor, regardless of payment source. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1990); Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the
COBRA's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186 (1986).
146. See H.R. Rep. No. 531, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid
Guide (CCH) T 37,070, at 16,653 (Mar. 25, 1988); Bernard, Patient Dumping: A Resident's
First Hand View, 34 THE NEW PHYSICIAN 23 (1985); Schiff, Ansel, Schlosser, Idris, Morrison
and Whitman, Transfers to a Public Hospital, 314 NEW ENGLAND J. MED 552 (1986), cited
in Waxman, Obligations in Emergency Room Service: Protecting the Patients and Person-
nel, 6 (11) HosP. L. NEWSL. 1 (1989); Pinkney, supra note 142, at 1, 21.
147. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 531, supra note 146.
148. See Office of Inspector General, Patient Dumping After COBRA, Assessing the Inci-
dence and the Perspectives of Health Care Professionals, No. OAI-12-88-00830 (Dec. 12,
1988), reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 37,580, at 18,989.
149. Based on the OIG study of three regions of the country, 151 complaints were filed in
a one and one-half year period. Id. at 18991. The 1988 Congressional study cited a total of
129 complaint cases from the initiation of the Act to January 31, 1988 based on conversa-
tions with Department of Health and Human Services staff. See H.R. Rep. No. 531 at 13.
These data, while inconsistent, do not compare favorably to the reported volume of abuses
in the Congressional study. Id. at 3-5. More recent data indicate that as of March 31, 1990,
437 cases had been referred to and investigated by the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion and, of these, eight cases were referred to the Inspector General's office for sanctions,
resulting in $272,000 in fines. Pinkney, supra note 142, at 21.
150. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (West Supp. 1990). The amendments responded to argu-
ments by a Texas physician that, based on Texas law, he had no contractual obligation to
provide care at the hospital merely by membership on the medical staff. The administrative
law judge hearing the administrative sanction case rejected this argument. See In re Inspec-
tor General v. Burditt, No. C-42 (DHHS Departmental Appeals Board, July 28, 1989). The
Burditt decision was the first administrative sanction imposed against a physician as a re-
sult of the patient dumping law. See Dechene, Physician and Provider Obligations Under
the Anti-dumping Provisions, 4(3) MEDICAL STAFF COUNSELOR 11, 15,17 (1990); Mellette, IG
Wins First Patient Dumping Case Before ALJ, 17(20) Med. Util. Rev., October 19, 1989, at
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word "individual" for the word "patient" throughout the patient
dumping statute, in an apparent attempt to eliminate any ques-
tions regarding the necessity for a patient-physician relation-
ship.151 The 1989 amendments to the patient dumping law also re-
quire on-call physicians to be responsible for the screening and
transfer of patients in an emergency medical condition. The physi-
cian who performs the initial screening examination of a patient
may have no liability whatsoever if the examining physician is una-
ble to get the on-call physician specialist to appear within a rea-
sonable period of time to evaluate and treat a patient in need of
the on-call physician's services. 152 Under such circumstances, the
attending physician is not subject to civil monetary penalties or
exclusion from the Medicare program if any transfer is later found
to be inappropriate. However, the on-call physician who falls or
refuses to appear can be subject to such penalties. 153
The patient dumping law amendments also require additional
record keeping for hospitals'54 and include whistle blower provi-
sions which protect receiving hospitals and other providers. The
amended statute mandates that hospitals and physicians provide
an appropriate screening examination, including all necessary diag-
nostic tests, prior to any inquiry into the patient's method of pay-
ment or insurance status.155
One of the most noticeable changes in the patient dumping law
is the elimination of the active labor requirement and the inclusion
of "labor," defined as a woman having contractions, into the defini-
tion of an "emergency medical condition".' 56 The definition of an
emergency medical condition includes both acute bodily injury or
disfunction and the threat of inadequate transfer time or risk dur-
ing transfer. Accordingly, for a patient in false labor who has no
destabilizing complications, the receiving hospital and attending/
on-call physician have a obligation to review the patient's condi-
151. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See id § 1395dd(i). Hospitals must record patient vital signs and more detailed diag-
nostic work-up information than the previous statute required. The amendments also re-
quire the hospital transferring a patient because of the non-appearance of an on-call physi-
cian to identify that physician. The hospital and its medical staff are required now to take
all reasonable steps to obtain a patient's written, informed refusal to further treatment fol-
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tion upon arrival and may only discharge the patient after the at-
tending/on-call physician has ruled out active labor and other
complications. 157
Over the last year, the patient dumping statute has been inter-
preted by a growing number of courts in a variety of contexts.15
The statute provides a basis for medical malpractice claimants to
obtain either state or federal court jurisdiction." 9 Once claimants
obtain such jurisdiction, at least one federal court has found that
the patient dumping statute provides a strict liability-based pri-
vate right of action for the health care consuming public.60
3. Other OBRA 1989 Changes
The OBRA 1989 legislation will affect Virginia health care prov-
iders in other ways.' 6 ' Some of the major provisions include physi-
cian payment reform112 and the establishment of a new federal
agency within the Public Health Service to study and make recom-
mendations on improvements in clinical practice and the organiza-
tion, financing, and delivery of health care services.16 3 The new
157. See Letter from Kathleen A. Buto, Director, Bureau of Policy Development, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, to the Honorable Ted Stevens (June 19, 1990).
158. Sorrells v. Babcock, 733 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Thompson v. St. Anne's
Hosp., 716 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Reid v. Indianapolis Osteopathic Medical Hosp., Inc.,
709 F. Supp. 853 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Verhagen v. Olarte, 1989 WL 146265 (S.D.N.Y. 1989),
case dismissed 1990 WL 41730 (1990) (finding no civil claim against physician violations of
Act); Bryant v. Riddle Memorial Hosp. 689 F.Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
159. See Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 854; Bryant, 689 F. Supp. at 493.
160. Reid, 709 F. Supp. at 855 (conceded by defendant hospital). The automatic applica-
tion of strict liability to persons directly resulting from patient dumping statute violations
has been rejected by other commentators. See Krugh, Is COBRA Poised to Strike? A Criti-
cal Analysis of Medical COBRA, 23(b) J. HEALTH & HoSp. L. 161, 164 (1990) (describing
negligence standards applicable to proving a patient dumping statute violation). The Krugh
article discusses in detail some of the difficulties that hospitals face in complying with the
strict requirements of the patient dumping statute and thereby avoiding civil liability. The
article also proposes statutory amendments that would reduce hospital exposure and limit
the broad scope of the statute to instances of patient dumping.
161. The OBRA 1989 legislation follows Congress' recent pattern of imposing major
changes in Medicare and Medicaid policy through budget bill provisions. This legislative
mechanism has been criticized in the past by former President Reagan, among others.
162. Other legislative changes include disproportionate share adjustment changes,
changes to payments for sole community hospitals and regional referral centers that would
affect rural hospitals, reductions in outpatient capital costs, and further delays in implemen-
tation of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 requirements that nursing home aides
complete training/competency evaluation programs. See Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2169
(1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-4 (West Supp. 1990)).
163. See Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2189 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 299 (West
Supp. 1990)).
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Agency for Health Care Policy and Research will consolidate and
expand existing treatment research functions at the federal
level."'
The OBRA 1989 legislation also expanded eligibility coverage of
children in certain low income families and of pregnant women for
Medicaid covered items and services. Additional provisions revised
the 1988 exclusion of the income and resources of a spouse of a
nursing home resident in computing the income and resources of
the institutionalized spouse.165 This substantially changes the
availability of Medicaid coverage for nursing home services.66
B. Federal Court Decisions Affecting Virginia Providers and
Consumers
1. Provider Suits Against State Medicaid Programs: Wilder v.
Virginia Hospital Association'1 7
On June 14, 1990, the United States Supreme Court determined
that a health care provider such as a hospital, nursing home, or
association of providers may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
enforce the federal Medicaid Act's provider reimbursement stan-
dards.6 " The Court decided that the applicable provider payment
standards created a substantive federal "right" enforceable by
providers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to ensure the adoption of reason-
able and adequate reimbursement rates. The Court noted that
providers are clearly the intended beneficiaries of the payment
provisions in the Medicaid Act, thereby resolving a dispute which
has divided the federal courts.'
164. Id.
165. Pub. L. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2271 (1989) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(c) (West
Supp. 1990).
166. Id.
167. 110 S.Ct. 2510 (1990).
168. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (West 1982 & Supp. 1990), providing that a state
plan for medical assistance must provide for payment:
of the hospital skilled nursing facility, and intermediate care facility services [for the
mentally retarded] provided under the plan through the use of rates.. . which the
state finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically
operated facilities in order to provide care and services in conformity with applicable
State and Federal laws, regulations, and quality and safety standards.
169. Compare Virginia Hosp. Ass'n v. Baliles, 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding health
care providers are one of the intended beneficiaries of the Medicaid Act) cert. granted, in
part, 110 S. Ct. 49 (1989) with Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602 (1975) (holding provider
lacks standing to sue).
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
In reaching its decision, a five-member majority of the Court
found that the statutory language, past administrative practice,
and legislative history all supported the view that the Medicaid
Act's payment provisions imposed a binding provider payment ob-
ligation on the states.170 The Court further found that the reasona-
ble and adequate rate standard was not so vague as to prevent ju-
dicial enforcement, and that the limited remedies available to
providers through the Secretary of Health and Human Services'
review of state plans and the availability of state administrative
appeals of certain issues did not foreclose a federal judicial rem-
edy.171 The Court noted that the ability of states to limit adminis-
trative review of reimbursement rates to the mere recalculation of
those rates and to exclude any consideration of the methodology in
state administrative reviews 17 2 provided hospitals and nursing
home providers with no opportunity to challenge state Medicaid
payment methodologies absent federal court review.
2. Advance Medical Directives: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health173
On June 25, 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided
that the United States Constitution permits states to limit an in-
competent patient's ability to forego all medical treatment, specifi-
cally artificial nutrition and hydration. The Court's decision in
Cruzan upheld a Missouri State Supreme Court decision denying
the parents of Nancy Cruzan the right, as her guardians, to order
the withdrawal of feeding tubes based on the lack of clear and con-
vincing evidence of their daughter's treatment wishes. The Cruzan
decision reaffirmed a state's role in the life or death decisions of an
170. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2522; cf. Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451
U.S. 1, 19 (1981) (holding that the statutory language in that case was cast in precatory in-
stead of mandatory terms and therefore did not mandate state agency compliance with fed-
eral law).
171. Wilder, 110 S. Ct. at 2522-23. The Court noted with approval that the Virginia Hos-
pital Association brought suit to seek prospective relief through reformation of the Virginia
State Plan for Medical Assistance. Id. at 2520. The case has yet to go to trial on VHA claims
that the Virginia Department of Medical Assistance Services officials have been under-reim-
bursing Virginia hospitals by approximately $1 million a week in Medicaid allowable costs.
See Henry & Johnson, Provider Challenges to Medicaid Plan Provisions in Federal Court:
Baliles v. Virginia Hospital Association, VI(1) HEALTH L. NEWS 3 (Va. St. B., Mar. 1990).
172. See, e.g., West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 701 F. Supp. 496 (M.D. Pa. 1988)
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1294 (1990)
(on expert witness fee issue).
173. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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incompetent and represented the first United States Supreme
Court ruling in a right to die case.174
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the rights of in-
competent patients, through their guardians, to withhold medical
treatment generally and life supporting medical treatment in par-
ticular. Four of the dissenting justices and one of the concurring
justices specifically found that there is a federal constitutional
right under the fourteenth amendment due process clause allowing
incompetents to refuse medical treatment.175 The majority opinion
also found that an incompetent has a liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment, but the majority assumed without deciding
that this interest rose to the level of a federal constitutional
right.17
6
However, the Court went on to find that Missouri was entitled to
establish strict evidentiary standards for the exercise of an incom-
petent patient's rights by a guardian. 17 7 The Court acknowledged
that Missouri's clear and convincing evidentiary standard was one
of several approaches that states could adopt and noted that the
lack of a true adversarial process in reaching termination of treat-
ment decisions was one basis for the clear and convincing eviden-
tiary standard.1 7 8 The Court also acknowledged that the Missouri
rules may, on occasion, frustrate the desires of persons who do not
take the time to express their treatment wishes while competent.17 9
However, the Court noted that an erroneous decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment is not susceptible of correction.180
In his dissent, Justice Brennan questioned the ability of a state
to make such a decision on behalf of the incompetent patient. He
would leave the decision-making role to those persons most knowl-
edgeable of the incompetent patient's true desires, i.e., the pa-
tient's family and friends.18 ' Justice Stevens in his dissent also
questioned whether the state had any legitimate interest in per-
sonal decisions that do not affect anyone other than the incompe-
174. Id. at 2852.
175. See id. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 2864 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
176. Id. at 2851. The Court relied instead upon the common law rights of competent pa-
tients to informed consent prior to treatment as the foundation for its decision. Id. at 2852.
177. See id. at 2852-53.
178. Id. 2853.
179. See id. at 2854.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tent patient."' 2 Both dissenting opinions questioned the Missouri
Supreme Court's determination that Nancy Cruzan's expressions
to family and friends of her desire not to be maintained in a coma-
tose condition failed to satisfy the standard for treatment with-
drawal. The Missouri trial court had relied on both these expres-
sions and the court appointed guardian ad litem's supporting
findings to rule in favor of treatment termination. The dissenting
justices questioned whether any prior expressions of comatose pa-
tients short of a properly executed living will or durable power of
attorney for health care decisions would be sufficiently probative
under the Court's view of the Missouri standard. 8 '
3. Antitrust Litigation Against Health Care Providers
In Wilk v. American Medical Association,8 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that the American Medical As-
sociation ("AMA") has unreasonably restrained referrals of pa-
tients to chiropractors in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 85 The district court's ruling followed a lengthy trial and was
based upon AMA documents, such as Principle 3 of the AMA's
Principles of Medical Ethics, 86 which the district court found were
used as a basis for boycott of referrals to chiropractors. The evi-
dence demonstrated that the AMA had previously labeled the
practice of chiropractic an unscientific cult. 87
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the
AMA's claim that its conduct represented protected activity under
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, relying on district court findings
that the AMA's conduct was not aimed at legislative bodies and
182. See id. at 2881-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2874 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2881-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. 895 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub. noma. Wilk v. Joint Comm'n on Accredita-
tion of Hosps., 110 S. Ct. 2621 (1990).
185. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
186. Former Principle 3 provided: "A physician should practice a method of healing
founded on a scientific basis; and he should not voluntarily associate with anyone who vio-
lates this principle." Wilk, 895 F.2d at 355, n.1.
187. Id. at 355-57. The district court had rejected the AMA's claim that it acted because
of a genuine and reasonable concern for scientific method in patient care and that it could
not adequately satisfy its concern in a way that was less restrictive of competition. Id. The
district court went on to find that, although the legal conspiracy had ended in 1980, the
boycott's "lingering effects" still threatened plaintiffs with current injury and ordered in-
junctive relief, i.e., affirmation by the AMA to its members that there are no current impedi-
ments to professional association and cooperation between chiropractors and physicians, ex-
cept as provided by law. Id.
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administrative agencies but was instead targeted at members of its
own association. The appeals court also affirmed district court
findings that there was not convincing evidence of either the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or the American College
of Physicians' alleged membership or participation in the AMA's
unlawful boycott.188
In United States v. Carilion Health System,189 the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling which
found that the proposed merger of Roanoke Memorial Hospitals
and Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley did not violate section
1 of the Sherman Act.19 0 The court ruled that prior findings of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia
regarding the relevant product and geographic markets were not
clearly erroneous.1 9' The Fourth Circuit noted that the district
court was evaluating the reasonableness of the merger as a whole.
Accordingly, the appeals court held that the district court's deter-
mination that a significant number of problems could be treated
on an inpatient or outpatient basis and that the hospitals compete
within the areas defined by the district court was not clearly
erroneous.
192
With regard to the geographic market for hospital services, the
Fourth Circuit noted that it should include all of the places to
188. Id. at 357-58.
189. 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished opinion).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
191. In United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), the dis-
trict court determined that the relevant product market included both inpatient and outpa-
tient services due to the differences of medical opinion as to whether a problem must be
treated in a hospital or whether outpatient treatment is appropriate. Id. at 844-45. More-
over, the district court found that the geographic market for hospital services differed with
respect to primary/secondary hospital services and tertiary hospital services. The district
court defined the geographic market for primary/secondary services as all areas from which
Roanoke Memorial Hospitals draws at least 100 patients per'year. The district, court then
determined that the tertiary service market included such areas as Richmond and Char-
lottesville, Virginia and Winston-Salem and Durham, North Carolina. Id. at 847-48. For
further discussion of the district court decision, see generally Urbanski, Antitrust Law: An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RiCH. L. REv. 455, 480-82 (1989).
192. In support of the district court's findings regarding the relevant product market, the
Fourth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had grouped banking services together and
considered all of the separate markets for loans, checking accounts, certificate of deposit,
etc. as one unit in evaluating the anti-competitive effects of bank mergers. United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). An Illinois district court adopted a more ser-
vice-specific approach in ruling against the proposed merger of two Rockford, Illinois hospi-
tals. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill.), arfd., 898
F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1989), petition for cert. filed July 2, 1990 No. 90-162.
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which patients would go if the hospitals were to raise the price of
their services.' 93 In affirming the district court decision on the rea-
sonableness of the Roanoke Memorial Hospitals--Community Hos-
pital of Roanoke Valley merger, the Fourth Circuit did not have
occasion to consider the district court's dismissal of the Clayton
Act claim raised by the government.9 4
In Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community
Hospital,95 and in Oksanen v. Page Memorial Hospital,196 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded four separate
antitrust cases filed against health care providers for further dis-
covery. The court also decided whether sibling corporations and
whether a hospital and its medical staff may "conspire" for pur-
poses of antitrust immunity.
In each of its complaints, Advanced Health-Care Services al-
leged that an acute care hospital located in Southwest Virginia was
exclusively marketing a competitor's durable medical equipment
("DME") products to its patients in return for a financial stake in
those DME sales. 97 The plaintiff requested relief under the Sher-
man Act, the Clayton Act, 98 and Virginia common law. The
Fourth Circuit found upon review that there was insufficient basis
on the record to dismiss the cases and instead found that factual
development through discovery should proceed. 99 Both the court's
opinion and the concurring opinion concluded that summary judg-
193. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989) (citing Satellite Television v. Conti-
nental Cablevision, 714 F.2d 351, 357 (4th Cir. 1983)). Again, the court found that while the
government's argument had some force, the record contained sufficient evidence that the
hospitals compete within the areas defined by the district court. The Justice Department
decided not to appeal the Carilion decision, and the merger of the hospitals went forward as
of July 18, 1990. See McGinn, Merger of Non-Profit Hospitals to Stand, Am. Med. News
May 18, 1990, at 3.
194. The district court had dismissed the government's actions under § 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982), on the ground that it had no application because the merging
corporations neither had stock nor were they subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission. The government cited the Clayton Act claim dismissal as an error in the dis-
trict court decision but only asked that it be considered if the Fourth Circuit remanded the
case to the district court for further proceedings. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. 840.
195. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
196. 912 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1990), reh'g en banc granted, (4th Cir. Sept. 30, 1990).
197. Advanced Health-Care Servs., 910 F.2d at 142-43. As the court noted, DME consists
of wheelchairs, hospital beds, walkers, crutches, and other equipment often used by persons
convalescing at home after hospitalization. Advanced Health-Care Servs., Nos. 89-2312, 89-
2376, 89-2377, slip op. at note 2 and accompanying text.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 1, 2, 14 (1988).
199. Advanced Health-Care Servs., 910 F.2d at 145, 149-51, 153.
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ment may be appropriate at a later stage of the case.2"0
In Oksanen, Dr. Oksanen brought antitrust claims under sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act as well as pendent state claims
under the Virginia Antitrust Act 201 and also for civil conspiracy,
tortious interference with contract, and defamation.0 2 Dr. Ok-
sanen alleged that Page Memorial Hospital and several members
of its medical staff collectively forced him from practice and con-
spired to restrain competition in, and monopolize, the practice of
medicine in Page County through the use of the hospital peer re-
view process and through other steps taken to impair Dr. Ok-
sanen's ability to practice medicine, such as refusing to provide
emergency room coverage for Dr. Oksanen's patients and coverage
during his absences.203 The United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia granted defendants' Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment without allowing Dr. Oksanen an opportunity to
receive defendants' responses to his initial discovery request.20 4 As
in Advanced Health-Care Services, the Fourth Circuit reversed
and remanded the case to allow plaintiff an opportunity to conduct
further discovery on his antitrust and pendent state law claims.205
The Fourth Circuit in both Advanced Health-Care Services and
Oksanen had the opportunity to consider the application of the
intra-corporate immunity doctrine to allegedly concerted, anticom-
petitive conduct by hospitals and other persons. 0 6 In Advanced
Health-Care Services, the court applied the intra-corporate immu-
nity doctrine to two wholly-owned sibling corporations, while in
Oksanen, the court applied the doctrine to a hospital and its medi-
cal staff.
In Advanced Health-Care Services, the court found that two
wholly-owned subsidiaries of Southwest Virginia Health Services
Corporation, Radford Community Hospital and its sibling DME
supplier corporation, were legally incapable of conspiring with one
another for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act.207 The court
200. Id. at 145 n.8.
201. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1990)
202. Oksanen, 912 F.2d at 75.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 75-76.
205. Id. at 79-80.
206. But see Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)(holding that officers or employees of the same firm do not provide the plurality of
actors imperative for a Sherman Act § 1 conspiracy).
207. Advanced Health-Care Servs., 910 F.2d at 147.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:655
adopted the reasoning of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits and several
district courts in finding that two corporations with identical own-
ers are legally incapable of conspiring with one another and can be
viewed as a single entity.2 °0 The Fourth Circuit also affirmed the
dismissal of the conspiracy to monopolize claim under section 2 of
the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act" 9 claim against Southwest
Health Services Corporation, Radford Community Hospital and its
sibling DME supplier corporation based on the inability of these
corporations to conspire with one another in accordance with the
court's interpretation of the intra-corporate immunity doctrine.21
In Oksanen, the Fourth Circuit relied on prior rulings of the
Ninth and Eleventh Circuits to find that physicians on a hospital
medical staff may conspire with the hospital and with each other
in the peer review process.2 1' In so holding, the court noted that
hospital staff doctors may have interests that diverge from each
other and that may be out of sync with the interests of the
hospital.212
C. Implementation of the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
On October 17, 1989 the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices published final regulations designed to implement the Health
Care Quality Improvement Act2 13 ("HCQIA") requirements that
208. See Directory Sales Management Corp. v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 833 F.2d 606, 611, (6th
Cir. 1987); Hood v. Tenneco Texas Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1984).
209. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988).
210. Advanced Health-Care Servs., 910 F.2d at 150, 152.
211. Oksanen, 912 F.2d at 77 (citing Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 891 F.2d 810, 819
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1960 (1990); Oltz v. St. Peter's Comm. Hosp., 861 F.2d
1440, 1450 (9th Cir. 1988).
212. Oksanen, 912 F.2d at 77 (citing Blumstein & Sloan, Antitrust and Hospital Peer
Review, LAW & CONTEMP. Paoss. 7, 51 (1988)). Notably, the court concluded that the hospi-
tal medical staff members acted as independent sole practitioners and pursued in many
instances personal economic interests. Oksanen, 912 F.2d at 77. This conclusion seems a bit
premature based upon the pre-discovery status of the case and may explain the court's deci-
sion to rehear the case en banc. However, the intent of this ruling could be limited by the
court's acceptance of plaintiff's allegations as true for purposes of summary judgment and
not that the court has found that medical staff physicians at Page Memorial Hospital acted
independently of the hospital in relation to Dr. Oksanen's continued medical staff member-
ship and privileges. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
Additionally, the events that transpired in Oksanen took place before the effective date of
the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1988). Under current
law, summary judgment is clearly appropriate if the statutory requirements are met. See
infra note 216.
213. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3784 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152
(Supp. V 1987)).
1990] MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
each person or entity, including an insurance company, which
makes a payment for the benefit of a physician or other health
practitioner in settlement of or in satisfaction in whole or in part
of a claim or a judgment against such physician or health care
practitioner for medical malpractice, report such payments to a
National Practitioner Data Bank ("the Data Bank").214 Addition-
ally, the Data Bank will receive and collect information based on
state licensing authority reports of adverse licensure actions taken
by state licensing boards2 15 and adverse actions on a practitioner's
membership status or clinical privileges taken by hospitals or other
health care entities.1 " As the regulations indicate, a health care
entity can include a hospital, a health maintenance organization,
and a professional society.2 7
In early 1990, the Public Health Service, in conjunction with
Data Bank contractor UNISYS, offered informational conferences
around the country to explain the requirements of the HCQIA and
specifically the Data Bank to practitioners, hospital administrators
214. 42 U.S.C. § 11131.
215. Id. § 11132.
216. Id. § 11133. The incentive offered to hospitals and other health care entities for com-
pliance with HCQIA reporting and inquiry requirements, is the availability of immunity
from federal antitrust liability. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11111(a)(1), 11112 (West Supp. 1990).
While the HCQIA offers no immunity from suits filed by physicians subject to disciplinary
action, e.g., reductions or revocations of hospital staff privileges, the HCQIA immunity pro-
visions do provide reviewing courts with a basis to enter summary judgment for health care
entities who comply with the Act's due process and reporting requirements. See Note, Phy-
sician Staff Privilege Cases: Antitrust Liability and the Health Care Quality Improvement
Act, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 609, 628 (1988); Mellette, Patrick v. Burget Decision sets
Antitrust Limits on Hospital Peer Review, 16(12) MED. UTiL. R Ev. June 23, 1988, at 5. A
recent California federal district court case granted summary judgment to a hospital and its
medical staff reviewers, adopting this approach. Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934,
(C.D. Cal. 1990).
217. See 45 C.F.R. § 60.3 (1989). Both the statute and the regulations require health care
entities to request data bank reports every two years and to report adverse actions against
health care practitioners in order to obtain the protections from suit offered by the statute.
The failure to report can lead to loss of immunity from antitrust actions, 42 U.S.C. §§
11111(b), 11133(c). The failure to obtain reports creates a presumption that the health care
entity knew of the information contained in the reports in the event of a medical malprac-
tice suit. See id. § 11135(b). In the event that a payment to a claimant is made as a result of
a judgment in or settlement of a medical malpractice complaint, an insurer or other person
making the payment is subject to substantial civil monetary penalties. Penalties of up to
$10,000 per payment can be assessed. Id. § 11131.
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and staff, and malpractice insurers.218 The conferences highlighted
key interpretive issues regarding Data Bank regulations and an-
swered many of the outstanding questions regarding Data Bank
operations. The Data Bank opened on September 1, 1990.219
V. CONCLUSION
The practice of health care continues to experience revolutionary
changes in the 1990's. Recent legal case decisions and legislative
enactments have created new challenges and opportunities for
health care providers, insurers, and the public at large.
218. See Rothschild, UNISYS Conference Briefs Medical Malpractice Insurers on Na-
tional Practitioner Data Bank, 23(3) J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 96 (March 1990).
219. Id.
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